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Abstract
Devolving tax authority to lower-level jurisdictions in a federation is often
argued to better align the actions of politicians with the wishes of voters. In this
paper, we derive the conditions for tax autonomy to bring about local growth-
enhancing policies -as the fiscal incentives approach of Weingast (2009) would
predict- and investigate whether this is indeed beneficial to voter welfare. We
add to the literature by modelling a multi-tiered, political agency setting where
growth-enhancing policies produce additional public revenues. Rent-seeking in-
cumbents can then improve their chances of re-election, by setting precisely such
policies and using the additional revenues for pork-barrel targeting. Surprisingly,
the resulting discipline effect proves stronger in a unitary setting, where all
of public provision is kept at the center. However, given a certain degree of
decentralisation and a sufficient amount of rent-seeking politicians, shoring up
discipline via sharper fiscal incentives is more effectively done at lower levels
of government. Expanding local tax autonomy will in this case unambiguously
boost voter welfare.
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I. Introduction
Decentralising functions of government is often argued to boost the accountability of
politicians, so that policies become more responsive to local preferences or needs.1
Because public services are brought closer to the voters, elections held in lower-level
constituencies are found to filter out the better kind of politicians at a quicker pace,
or to more effectively compel rent-seeking politicians to limit rent diversion.2 In other
words, and using the terminology of Besley and Smart (2007), decentralisation can
shore up both the latter disciplining effect of elections, as well as the former selection
effect.
Essentially, such accountability gains are believed to be at their highest when
taxation is to a certain degree decentralised alongside public services as well (Boadway
and Tremblay, 2012).3 This way, because voters can more accurately deduce how
much of their taxes go to lower-level governments, they get a better picture of the
true tax cost of local public spending. The available information to gauge the quality
of local politicians thus improves, especially when voters can compare their own tax
cost with the tax costs in other jurisdictions. Indeed, if residents in neighbouring
jurisdictions are known to pay a similar amount of taxes for better public services
for example, tax autonomy provides voters with a `yardstick' to size up the poorer
performance of their own politicians.4 Now, although we can reasonably expect these
information gains to make rent-seeking politicians more visible, the extent to which
voters stand to gain remains moot.
To see this, consider a situation where information on political track records indeed
improves because of tax autonomy, and the kind of yardstick competition sketched
out above. Rent-seeking politicians who are trying to gain re-election -and the larger
rents that come with it- by mimicking their benevolent counterparts, will then have
a harder time fooling the voters.5 However, if voters can only choose from a pool
of mostly incompetent, lax or corrupt politicians to replace the rotten apples, the
described information gains will be of little help. As with every measure improving
the selection effect of voting systems, the overall quality of politicians determines
whether voters will be better off in our setting as well.6 Making matters worse,
1Seabright (1996) was first to define accountability in this context as the probability that the
welfare of a given jurisdiction determines the election of the government. Persson and Tabellini
(2002a) and Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) provide further theoretical formulations of this political
economy perspective on fiscal federalism.
2See Faguet (2004) or Barankay and Lockwood (2007) for empirical evidence on the positive effect
of decentralisation on electoral accountability.
3For evidence on the impact of local tax autonomy on accountability, see Faguet (2004) for Bolivia
and Columbia, Geys et al. (2010) for Germany, and Boetti et al. (2012) for Italy.
4See Besley and Case (1995), Bordignon et al. (2003), Allers and Elhorst (2005), Bosch and
Solé-Ollé (2007) or Revelli and Tovmo (2007) for evidence on such yardstick competition.
5As we will discuss below, the `mimicking' strategy of rent-seeking incumbents exploits imperfect
voter information on the true cost of public provision. If this cost is low in a certain time period,
rent-seekers can simply `pretend' to be benevolent politicians charging higher costs, thus siphoning
off the cost-difference as rents. These rents are then smaller than the maximum rents, which would
lead to certain defeat in the next elections.
6Besley and Smart (2007) e.g. theoretically examine the effect of, amongst others, the increased
transparency of voting mechanisms and sharpened yardstick competition on voter welfare. The
proportion of able, benevolent politicians to `bad' politicians drives their results.
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since it became harder to fool the better informed voter, the opportunity cost for bad
politicians to pretend to be benevolent -in order to extract more rents after re-election-
goes up. Letting their mask fall before the elections by extracting the maximum rent
becomes more attractive in other words, which will erode political discipline. Here
then, and rather ironically, the information gains of tax autonomy in fact hollow
out the disciplining effects of elections when they are needed the most: when most
politicians are rent-seeking and selection effects no longer pay off as described above.
In this latter case, decentralised tax autonomy and voter welfare indeed seem to move
in opposite directions.
Importantly, as will be the focus of this chapter, there is more to decentralised
taxation than improved information. Focusing on a different kind of disciplining
mechanism, and abstracting from yardstick competition, Weingast (2009) makes a
case for fiscal incentives to steer local politicians towards better performance. `Per-
formance' is understood here as any kind of policy measure enhancing regional or
local growth, which in turn boosts revenues out of e.g. decentralised personal income
or property taxes. Self-rewarding revenue raising is key to this mechanism in other
words, allowing localities which `perform' well to tap into the resulting rising tax rev-
enues. And because office-motivated politicians never have enough funds to further
their goals or win over potential voters, it will then be in their own fiscal interest
to invest in growth-enhancing policies. Even when the pool of potential politicians
consists entirely of rent-seeking politicians the argument goes, voter welfare can thus
be upheld by the disciplining features of this fiscal feedback loop.7
Studying such a feedback mechanism from a political agency perspective in what
follows, our contribution will be to micro-found the kind of political incentives identi-
fied by Weingast (2009). Following Besley and Smart (2007), our model of imperfect
information spans two time-periods, allows for good as well as rent-seeking politicians,
and is applicable to multi-tiered forms of government as in Hindriks and Lockwood
(2009). Adding to the literature moreover, policy outcomes feed back into public
revenue flows, so that growth-enhancing policies -such as productive investment or
business-friendly regulatory efforts- bring about additional government income. Since
we also allow for two types of voters, and because voting is probabilistic, rent-seeking
incumbents may then use these additional revenues for pork-barrel targeting, winning
over what we call the priority vote.8 Priority voters have specific interests over non-
valence issues, where we think of the valence issue as an item on the political agenda
that all voters agree on, and which consequently captures the broader notion of gen-
eral welfare. In our case, this will be the kind of growth-enhancing policies Weingast
(2009) is referring to.9 Not surprisingly then, priority voters will lean more towards
the politicians targeting their specific interests,10 rather than voting for politicians
7See Weingast (1995, 2009, 2014) for further argumentation. Jin et al. (1999, 2005) and Kappeler
et al. (2013) present some evidence.
8Contrary to e.g. Brollo et al. (2013), these additional revenues will never be sufficiently large to
attract ever more rent-seeking candidates to the pool of politicians standing for office, or to inflate
rents beyond their initial maximum proportions.
9As also argued by Cadot et al. (2006), infrastructure investment is not a policy issue drawing on
the partisanship of voters, and thus rarely pits different parts of the electorate against each other.
10What we envisage here is a similar kind of pork-barrel targeting as in Roberson (2008), specifi-
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investing in the valence issue of economic growth. For the same reason, they will also
care less about the personal traits, or ideologies of their preferred politicians.
What we find is that everything hinges once more on the quality of the pool of
politicians voters can choose from, but also, and crucially, on the composition of the
voting population itself. If most voters do not have specific interests and only care
about the valence issue of economic growth, rent-seeking politicians will be hard put
to improve their chances of re-election through pork-barrel targeting. Indeed, the
more priority voters there are to be won over, the more the fiscal incentives will bite,
leading to less rent diversion. However, we show that this mechanism is stronger
still in a unitary setting, where all of public provision is kept at the center. The
reason is the reduced pivot-probability effect, coined by Lockwood (2006) and first
introduced by Seabright (1996), making it more likely for a central government to
opt for the mimicking strategy. The underlying idea is that, depending on the voting
rule in place, the incumbent central government only needs to sway a pivotal subset
of constituencies in its favour, whereas regional or local governments rely on a single
constituency to ensure re-election. The mimicking strategy of bad politicians -i.e.
postponing maximum rent diversion to later time periods- will thus be less costly
for a central government than for a subcentral government. Indeed, and in terms of
our setting here, because growth-enhancing policies only need to be introduced in a
pivotal amount of constituencies for a central government to be returned to office,
maximum rents can be extracted right away in the non-pivotal ones.
The built-in fiscal incentives mechanism à la Weingast and the cost reductions
working through reduced `pivot-probability' are then shown to be mutually reinforcing
in our model. As a result, the discipline effect of voting systems will always be stronger
at the center. When offered the choice between more or less decentralisation of public
functions subsequently, voters only prefer more decentralisation if politicians are less
likely to be rent-seeking to begin with, and selection is needed more than discipline.
Nevertheless, given a certain degree of decentralisation and a sufficient amount of
rent-seeking politicians, shoring up discipline via sharper fiscal incentives is more
effectively done at the lower level of government. Expanding local tax autonomy will
in this case unambiguously boost voter welfare.
Of course, and as discussed above, to study voter welfare from the fiscal incentives
perspective there can only be one kind of valence issue: economic growth. With its
focus on regional economic performance -and contrary to the accountability reasoning
where voters were perfectly free to fill in the notion of good policies themselves-
the fiscal interest approach inevitably has a rather narrow take. It simply reduces
welfare-enhancing policies to economically sound policies, and should therefore always
be carefully weighed against other arguments in favour of (de)centralisation.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section II.1 we set out our
fiscal incentives approach in further detail, and introduce the economic and political
environment of the model. In section II.2 we discuss the information available to our
main decision-makers, namely voters and politicians, and define the timing of their
decisions. Section III then considers a fully decentralised equilibrium within a federal
cally focusing on his notion of targetable local project provision.
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constellation, whilst section IV looks at a unitary setting and compares both regimes.
The main effects on voter welfare under both fiscal regimes are derived in section V.
Section VI offers some concluding remarks.
II. The model
Our federal economy consists of an odd number n ≥ 3 of lower-level jurisdictions,
referred to as states. We consider two time periods, and an election which is held in
between both periods.
II.1. The economic and political environment
Elected state politicians provide an amount of local, growth-enhancing public goods
Gi in each state i and each period, after observing unit costs θi of public provision.
These costs can only take on two discrete levels, a high value H and a lower value L,
where the probability of costs coming in at their highest level is Pr(θi = H) = qi. We
assume unit costs θi are independently and identically distributed in each period as in
Besley and Smart (2007), but are fully correlated across regions.11 State governments
only partially cover own public expenditures with own taxes ti, and are co-financed by
use of grants tf transferred by the federal government. As will become clear below,
federal grants are fully responsive to shocks in unit costs θi, which coincides with
many needs-based grant systems in the field. Total tax collections Ti = tf + ti then
finance public spending θiGi in state i, as well as the possible rents ri diverted by
the incumbent state government, so that Ti = θiGi + ri. The amount of rents ri
simply denotes the level of public spending devoted to private ends or other forms for
corruption, e.g. rewarding cronies.
The spectrum of voters [0, n¯i] in each state is normalised to 1, with each voter
deriving the same utility from public goods adjusted for the cost of government spend-
ing. When a state government provides an amount of Gi public goods at a tax burden
of Ti consequently, its voters incur a welfare level of Wi = Gi − µiCi(Ti). Capturing
the individual costs of taxation, Ci(Ti) is a strictly convex, increasing function where
the exogenous parameter µi denotes the marginal cost of public funds. Following
Besley and Smart (2007), a rise in µi captures either an intensification of tax com-
petition, the electoral passage of a (constitutional) restriction on the tax base or tax
instrument, or technological and administrative complications in tax collection.
Importantly, the spectrum of voters is made up out of two types: valence voters
occupy a share (1−ωi) of the field, whilst a portion ωi of priority voters accounts for
the rest. What distinguishes both types, is the fact that valence voters only derive
utility from the public good Gi, whilst priority voters have other concerns as well.
Put otherwise, even though all voters derive utility from the valence good Gi, priority
voters may derive even more utility from other policies which they consider highly
indispensable. Such policies can then range from e.g. the environment, poverty reduc-
11Since Gi embodies growth-enhancing policies such as productive investment or improved reg-
ulation, unit costs can realistically by assumed more or less the same across a federation. This
assumption also allows for tractable results in what follows.
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tion, accessible health care or effective education, but have in common the amount of
utility φi they add to priority voters' welfare. In what follows, and similar to models
of political polarisation used in Besley and Burgess (2001) or Besley et al. (2010), we
assume this latter gain φi to be of such a degree that only valence voters will let the
provision of Gi play a part in their assessment of incumbents. In other words, priority
voters will only care about their specific interests, and whether or not the incumbent
has in fact heeded these.
State governments are groups of like-minded, identical politicians of type xi ∈
{b, g} which -as in Besley and Smart (2007)- can be either of the `good' type g, or
the `bad' type b. The good kind of politician is a token benevolent leader, choosing
Gi in each period to maximize voter welfare, and hence drawing no satisfaction from
rents diverted from public spending ri. Consequently, and given θi, the level of local
public provision set by a state government consisting of benevolent politicians comes
in at
Gθii (θi, µi) = arg maxGi − µiCi(θiGi), (1)
with T θii = θiG
θi
i (θi, µi) the associated level of tax collections financing public spend-
ing. As mentioned above, the federal grants adjust fully to shocks in the unit cost of
public provision θi, so that t
θi
f = (1− νi)T θii and tθii = νiT θii , with νi ∈ [0, 1] the de-
gree of tax autonomy in state i.12 Under a state benevolent government lastly, voter
welfare is denoted as W gi (θi, µi). Unsurprisingly, both G
θi
i and W
g
i are decreasing in
µi, since a higher marginal cost of taxation has benevolent politicians set lower taxes,
resulting in lower levels of public provision.
Unlike benevolent politicians, bad politicians behave strategically by maximising
rents r1i in period 1 as well as discounted rents βσir
2
i in period 2, with β the discount
rate and σi the probability of an incumbent government being re-elected in state i.
The re-election rule, as well as the decision process of bad politicians, will be set out in
section III.13 We also assume there to be a maximum level Xi of state tax collections
-and thus also of rent diversion- that can be imposed on voters, where Ti ∈ [0, Xi]
and Xi > T
L
i .
Lastly, and introducing the fiscal incentives discussed earlier, we assume the in-
cumbent government can cater to the specific needs of a significant amount of priority
voters if it receives additional revenues Yi to finance such priority policies. Similar
to Jin et al. (2005), and since the valence good Gi captures growth-enhancing mea-
sures, public provision itself is assumed to generate these additional revenue flows to
the tune of Yi=νiRi(Gi).
14 Here, Ri is a strictly convex, increasing function with
12We thus assume the federal government can observe unit costs θi of public provision, but does
not know the type of the incumbent politicians. As a first mover, it therefore sets its federal grants
based on the unit costs only. Also, the degree of tax autonomy νi allows for the entire spectrum
between full tax autonomy and fully dependent lower-levels of government.
13Note also that we have, in effect, set β = 0 for benevolent politicians. As discussed in Lockwood
(2005), assuming that benevolent politicians are fully myopic delivers a unique and stable equilibrium
in the signalling game we will set up in the following sections.
14Of course, as in e.g. Keen and Marchand (1997) or Hindriks et al. (2008), productive public
inputs could also be modelled as contributing directly to state revenues through a tax on capital
earnings. Since we do not focus on inefficient over- or underproduction of public provision however,
this would leave our results unchanged. Moreover, our more generic approach allows for a broader
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Ri(0) = 0, whilst the degree of tax autonomy νi denotes the marginal retention rate,
i.e., the share of increased revenues a state government gets to keep. We can then
assign probabilities ρ(Yi) to the event of capturing a share η ∈ [0, 1] of the priority
vote when using the additional revenues Yi for pork-barrel targeting, as follows:
η [Yi (Gi)] =
{
1
2 + χ with ρ [Yi (Gi)]
1
2 − χ with 1− [Yi (Gi)] ,
(2)
where 0 < χ 5 12 , ρ(Yi) is increasing in Yi, and ρ(0) =
1
2 . What we find in expression
(2) in other words, is nothing more than the fiscal interest mechanism in full swing.
The more the incumbent state government invests in market enhancing policies or
infrastructure Gi, the higher its additional revenue flows Yi, and as a result, the
easier to win over a majority share η of the priority vote ωi.
II.2. Information and timing
At the end of period 1, an election is held in each state where one group of politicians
challenges the group in office. The group winning the majority of votes wins the
election. Whether the incumbent politicians at the beginning of period 1 -as well as
the challengers- are of the good type g or the bad type b is defined by independent
draws from an identical distribution. With a probability Pr(xi = g) = pii, a group of
politicians -incumbent or challenger- in a given state i will be benevolent. The ensuing
game between incumbent state politicians and voters is then defined as follows.
At the beginning of period 1, the type xi ∈ {b, g} of the group of incumbent
politicians is drawn for each state i. These incumbents then observe the unit costs of
public provision θi and their federal grant t
θi
f , after which they decide on state taxation
ti, rents r
1
i , and public goods Gi. Ahead of the elections the voters observe the amount
of public goods Gi provided in their state, as well as the collected taxes ti and tf to
finance public spending. The unit costs θi of public provision however, together with
the type of both the incumbent and challenging state politicians, remain unobserved.
What voters do observe is the probability qi that unit costs θi are high, the probability
pii that politicians are benevolent, and the degree of state tax autonomy νi. After
the elections, the elected group of politicians again sets Gi and r
2
i . Since there are
no elections after period 2, even newly-elected challengers can be considered lame
ducks whose actions will not be influenced by electoral pressure.
Clearly, since the actual type of politicians as well as the rents essentially remain
hidden to the voter's eye, the game described above has a distinct structure of imper-
fect information. To figure out whether the incumbent is benevolent or not, the only
option open to valence voters is to scrutinize incumbent performance during period
1, and weigh their -as such- updated beliefs about the incumbents' type against their
prior beliefs about the challengers. We elaborate on the resulting Bayesian equilibria
in the following sections.
Notice lastly how -contrary to e.g. the career-concerns models developed by Pers-
son and Tabellini (2002b)- politicians can be good or bad, and are equally competent
perspective on all possible sources of government income.
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to produce the desired amount of public goods at either unit cost θi ∈ {H,L}. More-
over, politicians are fully aware of this competence ex ante -in stead of ex post as in
Persson and Tabellini (2002b)- and will thus be able to hide their true type from the
voters if needed. Why they would want to do so, will become clear below.
III. Decentralised equilibrium
We solve the game of incomplete information described above by applying a type of
backward induction, obtaining a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium in each state. We
therefore start with period 2, and turn first to the interaction between politicians and
valence voters.
As there are no elections following period 2, the group of politicians in office in
that period will no longer be constrained by electoral discipline. Good behaviour
will never lead to re-election and future rents, which has bad politicians divert the
maximum amount of rents r2i = Xi. Setting state taxes ti so that Ti = Xi is diverted
away from public provision, Gi will be equal to zero as a result. Inversely, good
politicians never divert rents, set r2i = 0, and consequently decide on Gi following
(1).
Since second-period strategies are the same for bad incumbents or challengers
alike, i.e. extracting full rents, the best strategy for valence voters is to weed out
as many bad politicians they can during the elections. Their sequential voting rule
will as a result be to re-elect the incumbent group of period 1 if they think this
group is more likely to be benevolent than the challengers. In other words, if the
posterior probability they ascribe to the incumbents being benevolent surpasses the
prior probability pii of the challengers, they re-elect the incumbents. The voter's
posterior beliefs will thus inevitably be based on incumbent performance during period
1 only, and follow from the equilibrium strategies of first-period incumbents.
Zooming in on period 1, a benevolent state government then simply maximises
voter welfare following (1), and chooses (GHi , T
H
i ) with probability qi, or (G
L
i , T
L
i )
with probability (1 − qi). Logically then, since the voter has this information, his
posterior beliefs will assign probability zero to the incumbent being of the good type at
any other information set (Gi, Ti). Consequently, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
Pr(g|Ti) = 0 if (Gi, Ti) 6= (Gθii , T θii ). At any such information set, the valence voter
elects the challenger.
As a result, a group of bad incumbents has only three possible strategies left in
terms of first-period tax collection ti, so that, residually, Ti ∈ (TLi , THi , Xi). In the
latter case the bad incumbents claim the full rent r1i = Xi as in period 2, revealing
their true type b and as such separating from the good politicians. In the first
two cases on the other hand, incumbents undertake at least some measure of public
provision to hide their true type, thus mixing in or pooling with the good politicians.
The reason for this masquerade is the re-election motive, in full effect when the sum
total of expected rents over both periods outweighs rents Xi in period 1, so that
r1i + βσiXi > Xi, (3)
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where we have replaced rents r2i in period 2 with the maximum value of Xi, which
was the incumbent strategy of bad politicians in period 2. Now, filling in the blanks
in expression (3) are the unit costs of public provision, θi ∈ (L,H). Suppose the bad
incumbents face low unit costs L in period 1. By setting tax collections ti so that
T θii = T
H
i , and providing the corresponding amount of public goods G
H
i , they are
able to siphon off rents to the extent of r̂1i = (H−L)GHi . Inversely, when θi = H, the
incumbents will not be able to claim any rents without revealing their type. In such
a situation, where the pooling strategy does not pay any rents in period 1 so that
r̂1i = 0, the separating strategy always dominates. Indeed, r
1
i = Xi exceeds expected
second-period rents βσiXi to be gained after re-election. For exactly the same reasons,
valence voters always re-elect the incumbent group after observing (GLi , T
L
i ) in period
1, so that in any equilibrium we get that
Pr(g|TLi ) = 1. (4)
Arriving at the proper posterior beliefs based on the observation (GHi , T
H
i ) subse-
quently, is more intricate. Sure enough, valence voters know of the risk that a group
of bad politicians might pretend to be benevolent in order to improve its re-election
chances, yet it remains an uncertainty. They therefore assign probability λi to this
pooling strategy where
λi = Pr(Ti = T
H
i |θi = L, xi = b). (5)
Based on all available information, and using Bayes rule, valence voters then infer the
posterior probability that first-period tax collections THi were levied by benevolent
incumbent politicians as
Pr(g|THi ) ≡ Πi =
piiqi
piiqi + (1− pii)(1− qi)λi , (6)
which allows us to derive lemma 1 below.15
Lemma 1 Given the posterior probability Pr(g|THi ) = Πi defined in (6), and assum-
ing that qi >
1
2 , the valence voter will always re-elect the incumbent when observing
first period public provision of GHi .
Suppose now an incumbent government of bad politicians would only have to worry
about winning over valence voters. Its first-period strategies would then be straight-
forward at this point. If first-period unit costs θi are low, and given lemma 1, in-
cumbent politicians will face a re-election probability of σi = 1 if they provide G
H
i
at a total tax take of THi . From (3), we then deduce that the pooling strategy
r̂1i = (H − L)GHi will always be more beneficial than full rent extraction if and only
if
r̂1i + βσiXi > Xi. (7)
15A simple proof is provided in appendix V.A. Following Hindriks and Lockwood (2009), we assume
that qi > 1/2 in all states. This rules out the hybrid equilibrium derived by Besley and Smart (2007),
which was proven unstable in the Cho-Kreps sense by Lockwood (2005).
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If condition (7) does not hold however, or in the case that unit costs come out on
the high side H, bad incumbents will always separate and reveal their type. Their
probability of re-election σi is reduced to zero because of this.
Of course, and crucially, the voting population does not simply consist of valence
voters. Priority voters also influence the probability of re-election σi in (7) which, in
turn, alters first-period incumbent strategies as well. This is where the fiscal interest
mechanism kicks in, and where outcomes become rather less clear-cut as a result.
Indeed, by providing a certain level of market-enhancing public goods Gi incumbent
politicians will also generate additional revenues Yi, which can be used to finance
priority policies. Pulling in a larger share of the total vote, bad incumbents can thus
win the day in two ways: by pretending to be benevolent as before, and by winning
the hearts of priority voters. Since a group of bad incumbents will never set
(
GLi , T
L
i
)
since this would violate (7), we focus on the probability σi of re-election when the
incumbent sets
(
GHi , T
H
i
)
.
Adding to the realism and applicability of the model, we furthermore introduce
a probabilistic framework at this point, of the kind extensively used in Persson and
Tabellini (2002b). In this light, we assume that valence voters also care about a
second policy dimension, orthogonal to public provision Gi. We refer to this second
dimension as the ideology of a group of politicians, yet it could apply to any personal
characteristics of the politicians themselves. When casting their vote, valence voters
thus base their voting decisions not only on incumbent performance as captured by
lemma 1, but also on the ideologies of both competing groups of politicians. Specif-
ically, a given valence voter j will now re-elect the incumbent group of politicians
if
Πi > pii + γ
j
i + δi. (8)
As in Persson and Tabellini (2002b), the ideological policy dimension comes in through
both terms on the right side of (8). Here, γji is an individual-specific parameter
which captures voter j's individual ideological bias towards the groups of politicians,
which can take on negative as well as positive values. Voters for whom γji = 0 are
ideologically neutral, whilst voters where γji < 0 are ideologically biased in favor of
the incumbent group, and vice versa. We assume γji is uniformly distributed on the
interval
[− 12 , 12]. Second, the parameter δi reflects the aggregate popularity of both
political groupings across the population as a whole, which can also be positive or
negative and is again uniformly distributed, but now on the interval
[
− 12ξ , 12ξ
]
.16
Building on the totality of our framework, we can then derive the overall probability
of re-election σi in lemma 2.
17
Lemma 2 When the incumbent group of politicians provides a level of public goods
GHi , and with αi =
ωi(2ρ[Yi(Gi)]−1)χ
(1−ωi) = 0, its re-election probability σi of winning over
a majority of both priority as well as valence voters µi, is given by
16Both distributional assumptions facilitate closed form solutions. For a discussion of their gener-
alisation, we refer to Persson and Tabellini (2002b).
17See appendix V.B for the derivations.
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Pr
[
µi =
1
2
]
= σi (αi + (Πi − pii)) =

1 if αi + (Πi − pii) > 12
1
2 + ξ [αi(Yi, χ, ωi) + (Πi − pii)] Otherwise
0 if αi + (Πi − pii) < − 12 .
(9)
For a good understanding, suppose the probability of winning expressed by (9) lies
between zero and one. Plugging (9) into (7), we then arrive at the necessary condition
for a group of bad incumbents to provide GHi -in other words, opt for the pooling
strategy- which is
r̂1i + βσi (αi(Yi, χ, ωi) + (Πi − pii))Xi > Xi, (10)
where, using (5) and (6), Πi is defined by setting λi = 1 in the latter expression. In
other words, if the sum total of expected rents characterised by the left hand side of
(10) exceeds the rents to be captured in period 1, the incumbents will always mimic
the benevolent politicians to be re-elected. In any other case they separate, and are
voted out. We summarise in lemma 3.
Lemma 3 As long as r̂1i + βσi (αi + (Πi − pii))Xi > Xi, a group of bad incumbents
will always choose the pooling strategy, i.e. set
(
GHi , T
H
i
)
when θi = L, and will be
re-elected as a result. They separate otherwise, and extract the full rent r2i = Xi.
Now, this equilibrium clearly hinges on condition (10) and the probability of re-
election σi which, compared to a setting without priority voters, in turn depends
entirely on αi as defined by lemma 2. We investigate in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 When growth-enhancing policies lead to additional state revenues,
rent-seeking incumbent politicians can improve their chances of re-election by intro-
ducing exactly such policies, using the additional revenues to win over priority voters.
The extent to which they will do so, depends on
1. The marginal retention rate νi: the more revenues flow back into state coffers,
the more priority votes can be won over;
2. The share of priority voters ωi: as the share of priority voters grows, ideology
and popularity shocks grow less important;
3. The marginal cost of public funds µi: a lower marginal cost of taxation implies
higher levels of GHi , and higher revenues.
Proof From section II we know that Yi=νiRi(Gi), where Ri(0) = 0 and Y
′
i (Gi) > 0.
Since ρ(Yi = 0) =
1
2 , and zooming in on the expression for αi given in lemma 2,
αi =
ωi (2ρ [Yi (Gi)]− 1)χ
(1− ωi) , (11)
we know that (11) will be equal to zero when Gi = 0. Moreover, since ρ(Yi) is
increasing in Yi, we have that
dαi(Gi,νi,ωi,χ)
dGi
> 0 and αi(Gi, νi, ωi, χ) > 0 for all other
possible values of Gi, νi, ωi, χ, given that states enjoy some degree of tax autonomy
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νi ∈ ]0, Xi]. From (11) we also learn that dαi(Gi,νi,ωi,χ)dνi > 0 and
dαi(Gi,νi,ωi,χ)
dωi
> 0,
which, together with the fact that αi(Gi, νi, ωi, χ) > 0 when Gi = G
H
i as shown
above, proves points 1) and 2) of proposition 1 as higher values of αi increase the
probability that condition (10) holds. Likewise, since lower marginal costs of public
funds µi translate into higher public provision G
H
i following (1) and r̂
1
i = (H−L)GHi ,
we know that dαi(Gi,νi,ωi,χ)dµi > 0 and
dr̂1i (Gi)
dµi
> 0, which proves point 3) of proposition
1. 
What we learn from lemma 3 and proposition 1, is that the mere presence of priority
voters provides bad incumbents with a second incentive to work for re-election, aside
from pure reputation building. Indeed, without priority voters (9) would reduce to
the usual trade-off between reputational gains (Πi − pii) -achieved by the incumbents
after setting GHi - and popularity shocks δi. With priority voters on the other hand,
the fiscal incentive feedback loop results in more politicians choosing for the pooling
strategy, rather than simply separating. The stronger the feedback loop, and the more
priority voters, the higher this kind of electoral discipline. Lastly, lower marginal costs
of public funds µi not only fatten potential rents r
1
i as in Besley and Smart (2007), but
also bring about larger additional revenues Yi which strengthens the fiscal incentive
mechanism. Following lemma 3, both effects improve political discipline.
IV. Centralisation and comparison of fiscal regimes
Suppose now that instead of having n different state governments deciding on public
provision in their own state, a central government decides on the full set of regional
policies so that -since all public functions are now centralised- tax autonomy νi also
equals zero in each state. Second-period strategies remain unchanged for both types
of politicians in this scenario: a benevolent central government would still optimise
(1) for each state i, and a group of bad politicians would still extract maximum rents
r2i = Xi. As a result, valence voters again only look at first-period policies when
casting their vote, and since a benevolent central government also optimises (1) in
period 1, he or she again ascribes probability Pr(g|Ti) = 0 to any situation where
(Gi, Ti) 6= (Gθii , T θii ). At any such information set consequently, and in any perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, the valence voter elects the challenger.
The optimal strategy for a group of bad incumbents however, is different from
what we had before under decentralisation. This for the simple reason that a central
government usually does not require a majority of the votes in all of its constituen-
cies to be re-elected. As discussed in Seabright (1996) or Hindriks and Lockwood
(2009), the probability that a certain constituency is pivotal in the electoral outcome
is diminished once we move from a set of decentralised political entities to a unitary
constellation made up out of many constituencies. Following Hindriks and Lockwood
(2009) we apply a simple electoral rule here, where the central government only has
to gain a majority in m = (n+1)/2 states to be re-elected. Consequently, the pooling
strategy of mimicking the benevolent politicians when θi = H becomes more attrac-
tive, as
(
GHi , T
H
i
)
only needs to be set in m pivotal states, whilst the full rent can
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now be extracted in (n − m) states in period 1 as well. We derive the equilibrium
consequences of this kind of selective pooling18 in lemma 4.19
Lemma 4 A central government of bad incumbents chooses the pooling strategy in
m = (n+ 1)/2 states, i.e. sets
(
GHi , T
H
i
)
when θi = H, if and only if
m
nσi (αic + (Πi − pii))
(
1− r̂
1
i
Xi
)
< β, (12)
and is re-elected as a result. It separates otherwise, and extracts full rents nr2i = nXi.
As we show in appendix, the trade-off captured by (12) is nothing more than condition
(10) solved for β, adjusted for selective pooling and the fact that now νi = 0, which
alters αi.
20 Indeed, setting m = n and αic = αi has lemma 4 reduce to lemma 3.
In both cases the cost of fiscal restraint
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
-i.e. of not extracting the full
rent Xi in period 1- is weighed against the value of re-election, captured by the
discount factor β. The higher β relative to
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
, the more attractive the pooling
strategy for incumbent politicians, since fiscal restraint in period 1 becomes less costly,
and future rents more valuable. Furthermore, a higher probability σi of re-election
pushes the left hand side of (12) downwards, hence lowering the `trigger value' βCi =
m
nσi(.)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
at which point bad incumbents start choosing for the pooling strategy,
as also implicitly expressed by proposition 1. What distinguishes lemma 4 from the
previous decentralisation case however, is the selective pooling effect expressed by mn
in (12). We elaborate in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The disciplining effect of elections will be weaker under decentralisa-
tion, since the pooling strategy is more attractive when public provision is centralised.
However, given decentralisation, shoring up discipline via sharper fiscal incentives is
more effectively done at the state level.
Proof The first part of proposition 2 is trivial, as it is clear that
m
nσi (αic + (Πi − pii))
(
1− r̂
1
i
Xi
)
= βCi < β
D
i =
1
σi (αi + (Πi − pii))
(
1− r̂
1
i
Xi
)
, (13)
since mn < 1, r̂
1
i 5 Xi, σi is a probability and αi < αic. The latter inequality
holds because νi = 0, which yields a higher value of αi as expressed by (11) since
Yi=(1−νi)Ri(Gi) with centralisation, and ρ(Yi) is increasing in Yi. In any case, what
we learn from (13) is that the triggering value for bad incumbents to pool is as a result
lower in the centralised case, since βCi < β
D
i . Suppose now that σi (αi + (Πi − pii))
increases under any of the possible scenarios given in proposition 1. The amount by
which βCi drops as a result, will then always be only
m
n of the amount by which β
D
i
would drop. Increasing the probability of re-election thus boosts discipline more in
the decentralised case. 
18Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) coined the term, and were first to introduce Seabright's reduced
pivot probability mechanism to Besley and Smart's (2007) political agency framework, which allows
for selection as well as discipline effects.
19See appendix V.C for the derivations.
20The proof of proposition 2 below provides further insight in the adjusted αic under centralisation.
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As in Hindriks and Lockwood (2009), the option of selective pooling under central-
isation leads to more discipline and less political turnover, and this compared to a
decentralised setting. The fact that the probability of re-election σi is endogenous
to pork-barrel targeting through additional spending Yi, only reinforces this effect as
we can see in (13). However, once a decentralised constellation is given, endogenous
election probabilities can considerably improve local discipline on the margin. In-
deed, in any of the scenarios described in proposition 1 - an increase in the retention
rate νi, a larger share of priority voters ωi, or smaller marginal costs of taxation µi-
the resulting rise in σi will be more pronounced compared to a similar upshot under
centralisation. As a result, the triggering value for bad incumbents to choose the
pooling strategy will drop more sharply at the state level. Given the decentralisation
of certain public functions consequently, extending the degree of tax autonomy νi will
more effectively improve discipline compared to similar endeavours in a centralised
setting. When deciding on which tax bases to decentralise moreover, choosing a tax
base which is liable to induce less tax competition -and thus incurs a smaller marginal
cost µi- has the same effect. Of course, the question remains what proposition 1 and
proposition 2 mean in terms of voter welfare. We tackle this question in the following
section.
V. Welfare in both regimes
To size up the welfare effects of decentralising both public functions and tax autonomy
as specified above, we first need to describe voter welfare levels in several relevant, or
counterfactual, situations. In this light, we first of all write expected per-period voter
welfare when a benevolent group of type g is in office as
EW gi (µi) = qiW
g
i (H,µi) + (1− qi)W gi (L, µi), (14)
with qi the probability that the unit costs of public provision are high, or θi = H,
as defined above. Next, when the incumbent group of politicians is of type b and
furthermore extracts the full rent (Xi), welfare can be spelled out as
W bi (µi) = −µiCi(Xi). (15)
Using (14) and (15), expected voter welfare when an unknown type of politician is in
office -and when, if bad, incumbents always separate- then becomes
W 0i = piiEW
g
i (µi) + (1− pii)W bi (µi), (16)
with pii the probability that a politician is good, as specified earlier. Now, in order to
compare different political constellations in terms of welfare, we use a baseline welfare
level similar to the benchmark used in Hindriks and Lockwood (2009), given by
W¯i = W
0
i + β
(
piiEW
g
i (µi) + (1− pii)W 0i
)
. (17)
Our two-period benchmark W¯i thus captures expected voter welfare in a baseline
scenario where (10) holds -and all politicians are re-elected as a result- but where
13
bad politicians nevertheless separate. They are replaced by good politicians setting
welfare according to (14) with probability pii, or by bad politicians providing only (15)
with probability (1−pii), as expressed by (1−pii)W 0i in (17). Given this definition of
W¯i, and allowing for pooling, we can then write welfare in the decentralised setting
discussed above, as
EWDi (µi) = W¯i + λi(1− pii)(1− q)
(
∆di − βpii∆si
)
. (18)
What we see in (18) is that, if -with probability λi(1 − pii)(1 − q)- a group of bad
incumbents pools rather than separates, expected voter welfare EWDi (µi) will diverge
from the baseline in two important ways. First, voters face a selection loss in period
2. They miss out on the welfare they otherwise would have gained if the same group
of incumbents were to have separated, to be replaced by benevolent politicians with
probability pii. The present value of this second-period welfare loss returns as βpii∆
s
i in
(18), with ∆si = EW
g
i (µi)−W bi (µi) the gap between counterfactual welfare EW gi (µi)
and actual welfareW bi (µi) in period 2. Second, voters also enjoy a discipline benefit
in period 1. Because the group of bad incumbents exerts fiscal restraint rather than
diverting the maximum rent, voters attain a welfare level of W gi (H,µi) in stead of
W bi (µi), as expressed by by ∆
d
i = W
g
i (H,µi)−W bi (µi) in (18). Now, using the same
reasoning, we can write voter welfare in a centralised constellation as
EWCi (µi) = W¯i + λi(1− pii)(1− q)
(m
n
∆di − βpii∆si
)
. (19)
Comparing (19) and (18), a first difference lies in the benefits from pooling. Whereas
in a decentralised setting the benefits would be reaped in all n states, selective pooling
of the central government limits the benefits to m states. Second, and following
proposition 2, the pooling probabilities λi will also differ in both political regimes.
We formalise this comparison in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Depending on the triggering value for incumbents to pool, introduced
in lemma 4, we can distinguish between the following welfare scenarios:
1. If β 5 mnσi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
, EWDi = EW
C
i ,
2. If mnσi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
< β 5 1σi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
, EWDi > EW
C
i ⇔ pii > mn ∆
d
i
β∆si
,
3. If 1σi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
< β, EWDi > EW
C
i .
As a result, a decentralised system can only potentially Pareto-dominate a centralised
framework if a sufficiently large fraction of politicians is benevolent, so that pii >
m
n
∆di
β∆si
.
Proof Subtracting (19) from (18), we can write the potential welfare gains of decen-
tralisation as
EWDi (µi)− EWCi (µi)
(1− pii)(1− q) =
(
λDi − λCi
) (
∆di − βpii∆si
)
+ λCi
(
1− m
n
)
∆di , (20)
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with λDi and λ
C
i the pooling probabilities under decentralisation and centralisation
respectively. Following lemma 4 and proposition 2, we distinguish the following three
scenarios using the triggering values of pooling. First, when mnσi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
= β,
incumbents will separate in the decentralised as well as the centralised setting, so that
λDi = λ
C
i = 0 and (20) will be equal to zero. Inversely, when
1
σi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
< β,
pooling strategies are aligned so that λDi = λ
C
i = 1, yet welfare will be higher under
decentralisation as (20) collapses to
EWDi (µi)−EWCi (µi)
(1−pii) = λ
C
i
(
1− mn
)
∆di > 0. Lastly,
when mnσi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
< β 5 1σi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
, pooling strategies differ depending
on the fiscal regime. Whereas incumbents will no longer pool in the decentralised
setting, a central government still would -because of selective pooling- so that λDi = 0
and λCi = 1. Welfare gains under decentralisation then reduce to
EWDi (µi)− EWCi (µi)
(1− pii)(1− q) =
(
βpii∆
s
i −∆di
)
+
(
1− m
n
)
∆di , (21)
which will only be positive when pii >
m
n
∆di
β∆si
= p¯ii. For β sufficiently large and since
∆si > ∆
d
i , we have that 0 < p¯ii < 1. 
Zooming in first on scenario 1 and 3 in proposition 3, where equilibrium strategies
are aligned across fiscal regimes, we see that welfare nevertheless diverges between
centralisation and decentralisation in scenario 3. When incumbents are certain to
choose the pooling strategy in both regimes in other words, voters are better off when
decision making is decentralised. The selective pooling reflex of centralised govern-
ment is at play here, undermining the full potential of an outcome where the pooling
strategy would be chosen in each state. In scenario 2 of the proposition electoral
strategies do differ between fiscal regimes, as incumbents pool in a centralised system
but separate under decentralisation. Voter welfare now depends on the quality of
the pool of politicians voters can choose from. Characterised by a threshold value
of p¯ii =
m
n
∆di
β∆si
> 0, decentralisation only improves voter welfare when the quality of
politicians is sufficiently high, so that pii > p¯ii.
What emerges in this second scenario in other words, and similar to Besley and
Smart (2007), is the relative importance of the selection effects vis-à-vis the disci-
plining effects of an election. If the pool of politicians mostly consists of benevolent
politicians, strengthening the selection effect -here through increased separation with
decentralisation- serves voter welfare more than improving discipline, and vice versa.
Indeed, since pooling incumbents will eventually divert maximum rents in a future
term, replacing bad incumbents as soon as possible is welfare-improving if a sufficient
amount of benevolent alternatives is at hand. Unsurprisingly then, a similar trade-off
between selection and discipline effects presents itself when a change in the re-election
probabilities δi of incumbent politicians leads to a shift in equilibrium strategies. We
analyse the welfare effects of such a shift in proposition 4, focusing on the decen-
tralised setting where -following proposition 2- the impact of changes in δi will be
highest.21
21See appendix V.D for a proof.
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Proposition 4 Rent-seeking politicians facing a higher probability of re-election, ei-
ther through an increase in tax autonomy νi or a larger share of priority voters ωi, will
be quicker to pool. If the quality of politicians is sufficiently low -such that pii <
∆di
β∆si
-
these gains in discipline always improve voter welfare, and vice versa.
Naturally, proposition 4 also implies that when a large share of politicians turns out
to be benevolent, so that pii = ∆
d
i
β∆si
, improved discipline will in fact undermine voter
welfare. In this case, the degree to which voters value the selection effect denoted by
βpii∆
s
i in (18) rises, as a larger weight is ascribed to the selection loss ∆
s
i as opposed
to the discipline benefit ∆di . Also, and importantly, what is omitted in proposition 4
is the effect of a change in the marginal cost of taxation µi on voter welfare. The
reason is that, although such a shift will also alter the probabilities of re-election for
incumbent politicians, a general welfare effect also comes into play via (1). A separate
analysis in corollary 1 is therefore in order.22
Corollary 1 If the quality of politicians is low, so that pii 5 ∆
d
i
∆siβ
, rising marginal
costs of taxation unambiguously curtail voter welfare as more bad incumbents decide to
separate. Inversely, when
∆di
∆siβ
< pii, voter welfare may increase as discipline subsides.
These welfare shifts are more pronounced in a setting with priority voters.
Contrary to common knowledge, and also pointed out by Besley and Smart (2007),
increasing the inefficiency of a tax system through the marginal cost of taxation does
not necessarily pay off in terms of voter welfare. Tax competition for example, which
is thought to improve discipline and reign in rent-seeking, can in fact lead to the
opposite outcome here. Driving up µi leads to lower rents r
1
i and lower probabilities
of re-election for incumbents, as specified above, and thus to more separation. If most
politicians standing for office are also rent-seeking, voter welfare is hollowed out.
VI. Concluding remarks
Decentralising tax authority to lower-level jurisdictions in a federation is often argued
to improve the accountability of local politicians. In this paper, we derived the nec-
essary conditions for tax autonomy to bring about local growth-enhancing policies
-as the fiscal incentives approach of Weingast (2009) would predict- and investigate
whether this mechanism is indeed beneficial to voter welfare. In this sense, we are
first to model a multi-tiered, political agency setting where policy outcomes feed back
into revenue flows, which indeed keeps rent-seeking politicians in line.
What we find is that everything in effect hinges on the quality of the pool of
politicians voters can choose from, as well as on the composition of the voting popu-
lation itself. If most voters do not have specific concerns and only care about economic
growth, rent-seeking politicians will be hard put to improve their chances of re-election
through pork-barrel targeting. Indeed, the more priority voters, the more the fiscal
incentives will bite, and the less rents are diverted. However, we show that this disci-
pline effect is stronger still in a unitary setting where all of public provision is kept at
22A proof is given in appendix V.E.
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the center. The reason is the reduced pivot-probability effect, coined by Lockwood
(2006) and first introduced by Seabright (1996), where single jurisdictions become
less pivotal in ensuring the re-election of a central government. Investing in a bare
minimum of constituencies then suffices for a central government to be re-elected,
making it more attractive for bad politicians to opt for this strategy of postponing
maximum rent extraction.
Discipline will be more effective at the center in other words, despite the built-in
fiscal incentives which are in fact mutually reinforcing in this case. When offered the
choice between fiscal regimes consequently, voters would only prefer decentralisation
if politicians are less likely to be rent-seeking to begin with, so that selection is needed
more than discipline. Nevertheless, given a certain degree of decentralisation and a
sufficient amount of rent-seeking politicians, shoring up discipline via sharper fiscal
incentives is more effectively done at the lower level of government. Expanding local
tax autonomy will in this case unambiguously boost voter welfare.
Appendix A. Proof of lemma V.1
The valence voter will always re-elect the incumbent after observing first period public
provision of GHi when his posterior beliefs Πi outweigh his prior beliefs pii:
Pr(g|THi ) = Πi =
piiqi
piiqi + (1− pii)(1− qi)λi > pii. (22)
Solving (22) for λi we get that
Πi > pii ⇔ qi
(1− qi) > λi, (23)
which, since λi ∈ [0, 1], will always be the case as long as qi > 12 . 
Appendix B. Derivation of lemma V.2
Let us first look at a `swing' valence voter s whose ideological bias makes him in-
different between the two parties so that, after observing
(
GHi , T
H
i
)
in period 1, we
get
γsi = Πi − pii − δi. (24)
All valence voters j with γji 5 γsi thus prefer the incumbent grouping of politicians.
Consequently, given our distributional assumptions, and using (2), the incumbent
group can expect to win the following overall vote share µi after setting
(
GHi , T
H
i
)
in
period 1:
µi = ωiE (η [Yi (Gi)]) + (1− ωi)
(
γsi +
1
2
)
. (25)
Plugging in (24), we obtain
µi = ωiE (η [Yi (Gi)]) + (1− ωi)
(
Πi − pii − δi + 1
2
)
, (26)
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from which we get that
Pr
[
µi =
1
2
]
= Pr
[
ωiE (η [Yi (Gi)]) + (1− ωi)
(
Πi − pii − δi + 1
2
)
= 1
2
]
. (27)
Since we know that
E (η [Yi (Gi)]) = ρ [Yi (Gi)]
(
1
2
+ χ
)
+(1− ρ [Yi (Gi)])
(
1
2
− χ
)
= (2ρ [Yi (Gi)]− 1)χ+1
2
> 0,
(28)
we can write (27) as
Prob
[
µi =
1
2
]
= Prob
δi
[
ωi (2ρ [Yi (Gi)]− 1)χ
(1− ωi) + (Πi − pii) = δi
]
, (29)
or, setting ωi(2ρ[Yi(Gi)]−1)χ(1−ωi) = αi, as
Pr
[
µi =
1
2
]
= Prob
δi
[αi + (Πi − pii) = δi] . (30)
Using (30), and given our distributional assumptions on δi, the probability for the
group of incumbents of winning the elections then becomes
Pr
[
µi =
1
2
]
= σi (αi + (Πi − pii)) =

1 if αi + (Πi − pii) > 12
1
2 + ξ (αi + (Πi − pii)) Otherwise
0 if αi + (Πi − pii) < − 12 .
(31)
Of course, the implicit assumption behind the previous argumentation is that the bad
incumbents will always use the additional revenue gains Yi to cater to the priority
vote, and thus improve their re-election chances σi. We assume this will be more
beneficial than simply diverting away these additional revenues as rents, so that
r̂1i + Yi + βiσi (Πi − pii)Xi < r̂1i + βiσi (αi + (Πi − pii))Xi, (32)
keeping in mind that αi(G
H
i , χ, ωi) = 0 when no additional revenue Yi is invested
in the priority vote, because ρ(Yi = 0) =
1
2 . Since Yi concerns additional revenues,
and Xi constitutes the bulk of public spending furthermore, (32) will hold in most
realistic situations.
Appendix C. Derivation of lemma V.3
The necessary condition for a group of bad incumbents to provide GHi when θi = H
in m states -in other words, opt for the selective pooling strategy- will be
mr̂1i + (n−m)Xi + nβσi (αi + (Πi − pii))Xi > nXi. (33)
Note that, because the unit costs of public provision θi are assumed fully correlated
across states, the central government can decide to pool in all of the m = (n + 1)/2
necessary states. Reworking (33) then gives us
m
(
r̂1i −Xi
)
> −nβσi (αi + (Πi − pii))Xi, (34)
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or, solving for β,
m
n
(
Xi − r̂1i
)
σi (αi + (Πi − pii))Xi < β, (35)
so that, collecting terms, we obtain
m
nσi (αi + (Πi − pii))
(
1− r̂
1
i
Xi
)
< β. (36)
Appendix D. proof of proposition V.4
Focusing on an increase of νi or ωi, and thus limiting our attention to a rise in
σi (αi(Gi, νi, ωi, χ) + (Πi − pii)) only, we have that
1
σi
(
α
′
i + (Πi − pii)
) (1− r̂1′i
Xi
)
= βD
′
i < β
D
i =
1
σi (αi + (Πi − pii))
(
1− r̂
1
i
Xi
)
, (37)
where βD and β
′
D again denote the triggering values for the incumbents to pool, but
now before and after a shift in νi or ωi respectively. This upwards shift leads to higher
levels of αi(Gi, νi, ωi, χ) as proven in proposition V.1, which we mark out in (37) as
α′i > αi. Since σi denotes a probability furthermore and
dσi
dαi
> 0 following lemma V.2,
the direction of the inequality sign in (37) follows. Turning now to welfare effects, we
write post-increase welfare as
EWD
′
i (µi) = W¯i + λ
′
i(1− pii)(1− q)
(
∆di − βpii∆si
)
, (38)
with λD
′
i the altered pooling probabilities after the increase. Subtracting (18) from
(38), we then derive the potential welfare gains of an increase in νi or ωi as
EWD
′
i (µi)− EWDi (µi)
(1− pii)(1− q) =
(
λD
′
i − λDi
) (
∆di − βpii∆si
)
. (39)
Using lemma V.3 and (37), we can once more distinguish three scenarios using the
triggering value of pooling. First, when 1
σi(αii)
(
1− r̂1
′
i
Xi
)
= β, incumbents will sepa-
rate in the decentralised as well as the decentralised setting, so that λDi = λ
D′
i = 0
and (39) will be equal to zero. Inversely, when 1σi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
< β, pooling strate-
gies are aligned so that λDi = λ
D′
i = 1 and (39) is again equal to zero. Lastly, when
1
σi(αii)
(
1− r̂1
′
i
Xi
)
< β 5 1σi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
, pooling strategies will be different before
and after the shift in νi or ωi. Where incumbents would have separated before the
rise in re-election probabilities, they will now keep on pooling so that λDi = 0 and
λD
′
i = 1. Welfare gains after the increase then become
EWD
′
i (µi)− EWDi (µi)
(1− pii)(1− q) =
(
∆di − βpii∆si
)
, (40)
which will only be positive when pii <
∆di
β∆si
. Again, for β sufficiently large and since
∆si > ∆
d
i , we have that 0 < p¯ii < 1. 
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Appendix E. proof of corollary V.1
Taking the total derivative of (18) with respect to µi, we obtain
∂EWDi (µi)
∂µi
=
∂W¯i(µi)
∂µi
+
∂λi
∂µi
(1−pii)(1−q)
(
∆di − βpii∆si
)
+λi(1−pii)(1−q)
(
∂W gi (H,µi)
∂µi
+ Ci(Xi)− βpii
(
∂EW gi (µi)
∂µi
+ Ci(Xi)
))
,
(41)
with,
∂W¯i(µi)
∂µi
=
∂W 0i (µi)
∂µi
+ β
(
pii
∂EW gi (µi)
∂µi
+ (1− pii)∂W
0
i (µi)
∂µi
)
< 0, (42)
∂W 0i (µi)
∂µi
= pii
∂EW gi (µi)
∂µi
− (1− pii)Ci(Xi) < 0, (43)
and,
∂EW gi (µi)
∂µi
= q
∂W gi (H,µi)
∂µi
+ (1− q)∂W
g
i (L, µi)
∂µi
< 0, (44)
∂W bi (µi)
∂µi
= −Ci(Xi) < 0. (45)
Suppose now that for µi = µ¯i, we have that (10) becomes
r̂1i (µi) + βσi (αi(Gi, νi, χ, ωi) + (Πi − pii))Xi = Xi. (46)
Since
dr̂1i (µi)
dµi
< 0 and dσidµi < 0 as specified earlier, we obtain for all values µi < µ¯i
that
r̂1i (µi) + βσi (αi(Gi, νi, χ, ωi) + (Πi − pii))Xi > Xi, (47)
or that 1σi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
< β. From lemma 3 we then find that in the resulting pooling
equilibrium ∂λi∂µi = 0 , and λi = 1. This allows us to write (41) as
∂EWDi (µi)
∂µi
=
∂W¯i(µi)
∂µi
+(1−pii)(1−q)
(
∂W gi (H,µi)
∂µi
+ Ci(Xi)− βpii
(
∂EW gi (µi)
∂µi
+ Ci(Xi)
))
,
(48)
which, plugging in (42) and (43), and collecting terms, yields
∂EWDi (µi)
∂µi
= pii (1 + β + βq − βqpii)
∂EW gi (µi)
∂µi
−(1− pii)
(
(q + β(1− pii) + β(1− q)pii)Ci(Xi)− (1− q)
∂W gi (H,µi)
∂µi
)
= Ψi,
(49)
where, using (44) and (45), we know that Φi < 0. Inversely, when µi = µ¯i, we get
that
r̂1i (µi) + βσi (αi(Gi, νi, χ, ωi) + (Πi − pii))Xi 5 Xi. (50)
From lemma V.3 we know that when β 6 1σi(αi)
(
1− r̂1iXi
)
results in a separating
equilibrium where ∂λi∂µi = 0 and λi = 0. We can then write (41) simply as
∂EWDi (µi)
∂µi
=
∂W¯i(µi)
∂µi
< 0. (51)
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In the neighbourhood of µ¯i lastly, we know a value µi . µ¯i exists for which a marginal
increase implies a shift from the pooling to the separating equilibrium according to
lemma 3, so that ∂λi∂µi = −1 and λi = 1. From (41), and using (49), we now obtain
∂EWDi (µi)
∂µi
= Ψi − (1− pii)(1− q)
(
∆di − βpii∆si
)
, (52)
which will only be positive if and only if
(1− pii)(1− q)
(
∆di − βpii∆si
)
< Ψi. (53)
Since we know from (49) that Ψi < 0, this implies that
∆di
∆siβ
< pii is a necessary
condition for (53) to hold. The last part of the corollary is proven by considering a
discrete jump off µi rather than thinking on the margin. As proven in proposition V.2,
any discrete jump in µi -as well as the resulting change in βi defining the interval where
politicians switch equilibrium strategies- will be larger the larger αi since
dδi
dαi
> 0,
and thus the more priority voters in the population as dαi(Gi,νi,ωi,χ)dωi > 0. This proves
the last part of the proposition. 
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